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The Ambivalent Self 
Judith Farr Tormey 
No problea a � rO:ea more a t  t!"e heart of our relation to the 
c�11aa, to others and even to ourselves than the problea of 
a•btvalen Of! .  Throughout human history forces in the universe 
have appeared both friendly and hostile. O�her persona aee111 
capable of bo;h loving and hating. And an individual 
experiences with db,quieting frequency the opposing motivea 
that lead to both wanting and not vanting�to do, to be 
o,r to have. 
Posaib t l i t i es  for the developeent of the.ea associated with 
aabivalence are innu111erable. The focus of •Y discussion w i l l  
be Sartre's work a s  i t  ca n  be contrasted with that of Freud. 
To form this contras t ,  I shall be concerned with a cluster of 
interrelated conOl!pta: ambivalence, contradiction and 
self-decep;ton. Philosophically, the concept of contradiction 
is the 111>st basic because what is interesting and probleaatic 
abOQt the other two, aabivalence and self-deception, ste�a 
directly frOC1 their seeming to violate the ·1av of contradic­
tion· and froai the heroic atru��le that haa been required 
of the hu .. n mind to try to rende r their occurrence intel­
ligible in the face of this violation. 
A contradiction arises when it seems necessary for an ade­
q ua t e  description to attribute to one and the same thing both a 
property and its oppos i t e .  Thus Freud, in �Instincts and their 
Viciss itudes· says of the ambivalence of feeling: 
The fact that, at the later period of developeent 
(after reversal has occurred ) the instinct in i t s  
pri..ary f o r'1n  ma y  be obee�ed aide by aide with t t a  
(passive} oppos i t e  deseTVes to be diatt°"utshed by 
the highly appropriate na111e introduced by Bleuler: 
aabivalence • • • •  I t  is particularly coca.on to 
find (both love and hate} di rected siaul;aneously to­
ward the sane object and this phenOC1enon of their co­
existence furnishes the moat important example of aa­
bi valenoe of feeling. l 
And Jeffrey lussell describing persontftcattons of evil in 
Western and non-Western cultures says: 
BecauM the coa.os ts aomettmea benign aad. eomettmea 
hostile to hu11anity, and becauae human nature ts alao 
divided against i t s e l f ,  90at societies that accept 
the idea of a divine principle cons ider the principle 
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.. bivalent. The God hes tvo faces : he i s  a coinci­
dence of oppos i t es .  In .acotheisa the Cod may be 
thought of ae eabodying tvo opipoa i�e tendencies in 
one per aon. 2 
Wben thia tenaion of opposite• beco.e9 too great to sustain the 
unity of contradictory ele�nta within one self,  however, a 
• p l i t t i a,t  or •tvtnniag· occurs and o n e  aspect takes on separate 
( i f  not alvaye independent) existence. The various fonas of 
theological duali•• or polytheiaa reflect the intellectual 
unvi l lingneaa to accept the contradiction o f  ••bivalenc e .  A!I 
ve shall see,  • contrast atrikiogly ai•il•r to the contrast 
between 1110notheia• and dualia• (or polytheiaa) can be found in 
a coapariaon between Sartre and Freud--Sartre essentially 
eabracing the contradictory i n  a n  attempt to preserve the unity 
of self (or co1Wciouenee e ) 1  Freud being dri�en to s p l i t  the 
••bivalent self into part•· (The development of P l a to'• 
reflectiolW on the soul f ram the Phaedo to l a t e r  dialogues such 
ae the Phaedrue e�e•plify the proble m . )  
Self-deception i e  • cotam>n maneuver, a t  least o n  the hu111an 
level, to escape the agony of «11bivalence, but 1 t  also seems to 
generate new contradlctons. When we uae the eitpreeaion '1aelf­
deception , '  we can a e e  that i t  t r a nslates easily into the 
notion of ' lying to one'• self . '  Since to tell a lie one must 
believe one thing but get one '• victim to be lieve i � •  oppo site, 
!!!,!. decep�ion becomes a f on1 of epiate110loglcal ••bivalence 
involving 'be l i eving and not believing the aame thing. The 
'90tivation for the lie to one'a aelf aay be the belief that I 
have conf l i c t ing a1tOtions tovard a pe rson, e . R .  I both love 
and hate that person. The content of the lie la the denial of 
one of the aebivalent 110tivational branches , e . � .  I don ' t  hate 
that person. It ia interest ing to speculate whether eelf­
deception .. y ,  in •oee caaee, be necessary for action in the 
face of the paralysis that vou ld otherwise be a consequence of 
genuinely ambivalent motives . Perhaps if Haalet had been able 
to be 1a0re self-deceptive, he would have found it easier to 
a c t .  
Hy the.is, then, ia that a unified aelf requires, i n  the 
face of aabivalence and self-deception, an acceptance of con­
tradiction; and l w i l l  i l lustrate this with • detailed e�amlna­
tion of Sartre'a philosophy. Since the acceptance of contra­
diction haa been aeen aa • violation of rational i t y ,  caajor 
theorists auch as Freud have been driven to a aplltting or 
•twinning• of the eubject--in fact, a fon1 of complicated psy­
chological Manichaei••· Thie in turn, ta problematic because 
i t  represents an abandonment of the unity and Integrity of the 
a e l f .  The Id becoaee an •alien other· auch like the �reon­
ification of the devil aa a principle of evil described by 
Rueae 1 1 .  
S o  we are faced with a n  uneasy dileau: accept naonie1'1 
whether psychic or cosmic, and embrace contradiction or move in 
the direct ion o f  a duali•tic split that generates parado�ea of 
ita own .  
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I w i l l  first e�am1ne Sartre'a reasons for accepting con­
t radictton; then discuss, briefly, his arguments .against Freud. 
SaTtre and Contradiction 
There are a variety of ways that the ·1aw of cont radiction­
( o r  alternatively the "'law of non-contrad iction·) has been 
interpreted. However it is interpreted, it is eaaentiallv a 
law that sets or describes limits. Thus if it is given a 
metaphysical interpretation, its truth implies restrict ions on 
what can be the case. on what prope r t i e s ,  for example, things 
can have--..ihat they can be. Thus the same god could not be 
both good a nd  e v i l .  When it is interpreted as a law of 
thouj(ht, it describes restrictions on what can "be conceived, 
imagined or believed. A person could not believe that an 
object both has and does not have a certain property. This 
becCJ1Des particularly problematic when the belief is about one 's 
s e l f .  In a third formulation, the law of contradiction can be 
seen as the ultimate limitation on what can intelligibly be 
s a id, a li�itation on our description of objects and of our­
selves. 
However the law of contradiction i s  interpreted, it can be 
se·en frOG! an examination of Sartre's philosophy that he does 
not consider it to hold. ln fact, the existence that human 
beings as conscious beings have, according t o  his account, 
violates the law in its 111etaphysical interpretation; some 
a t titudes or beliefs conscious beings adopt tow·ard themselves 
violate the law as a law of though t ;  and finally1 as a con­
se1quenoe of i t s  failure to hold in the �taphysical and psycho­
logical spheres, our descriptions of human e·xistence T!IUSt 
contain contradictions in order to be adequate descriptions, 
thus it cannot hold as s law of language. The alternative, 
Sartre wants to claim, i s  a division i n  the unity of con­
sciousness that, i t s e l f ,  ultimately violates the law of con­
t radiction. Thus, there may be no escape from contradiction. 
It is interesting to note that philosophers �ho represent, 
perhaps paradigmatically, an approach to philosophy signifi­
cantly in contrast with the Sartrean method have provided 
important insights into the problematic status of the lav of 
contradiction. Ernest Nagel argues in "'Logic without Onto­
logy"'3 that it can't be proved as a metaphysical principle 
without circularity. More recently G . R .  von Wright raises the 
question in Time, Change and Contradiction whether "'time saves 
us frOID contradi ction.· He notes that only the divisibility of 
time into discrete intervals enables contradicto·ry characteri­
zations to be avoided. But, von Wright argues, if we substi­
tute a continuous flow theory of time we must characterize the 
world �hen it changes as -q !!!!!_ q. That i s ,  our descript ion of 
t he  vorld will contain a contradiction. "'The world will 
someti.es have to be described as being both in a certain s t a t e  
a nd  in t h e  contradictory state • • • •4 
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Ve aist see, then, how and vhy Sartre places htaaelf in the 
ca•p of those philoeophers (begi nning perhaps in Western 
philoeophv vitti Heraclitus) for vhO!I contradict ion 1e f i rs t  of 
a l l  a .et-i>hysical reality, a nd ,  i n  addition part of soae at 
leat1t of our thou�ht procesaea. To illuatrate this aspect of 
Sattre'a p�1109ophy, I vtll focus on his f a.oua exploration of 
the proble• of hu .. n f reedcm. The theaia I propoae ta tha� the 
self that ia both A at\d -A--i . e .  the aabivalent aelf--ia not 
deterained to act by anything. It i s ,  in fact, ·radically 
f r e e . �  If anything at a l l  is done (Cf. the famous story of 
15ur1dan'a A e a ) ,  i t  ia done freely. 
A fundamental queation to raiae in an approach t,o any 
ph1loaopher's vorlt ia 'Vhat doea a/he conceive the taalc. of 
doing phtloeophy to be ? •  Ve can give at the outset at least a 
negative reply to this question for Sartre. He •kes it clear 
that he does not conceive hi8 task to be conatruction of 
proof a. When a contradiction arises in a proof, it muat be 
e l i ainated by alteratioft9 in vhatever led to ita appearance. 
(Contradict,ory preabee iaply everything--ae I vant to argue 
contradictory psychological atatee open the aelf faced vith the 
neceaaity to cho09e to every possibility . )  
Sartre explicitly atatea that the experience that reveals 
freedom to us, the experience of anguish, cannot be thought to 
be a proof that we are free: 
• • • anguish has not appeared t o  u a  as a proof of 
f reedOAj We viahed only to ahov that there 
exists a specific consciousness o f  freedom, 
this conecioueneee is angut eh. S 
The experience of anguish is first of all an experience 
generated. by certain f eaturee of human existence. Central 
amon� these ts the capacity of hu1111n beings to raise questions. 
Han, for Sartre, i s  a quest ion-asking antul , and underatanding 
the preaupposittona of the activity of raising q ue s tions ts 
essential for unde'ttltandiog much of Sartre'a philosophy frocn 
thia J»riod. It i a  through the raising of queetiona, Sartre 
clat•e, that we experience nothingnea e ,  and the experience of 
f reedam. First then: 
Every question presuppoaes a being vho q ue s t iona and 
a being vhich t e  queattoned. The queation ts a kind 
of expectation; I expect a reply f rgm the being 
quieationed. 6 
Raising a question introduces the expectation of a reply. But 
the reply a.ay be negative. Thus, to uae one of Sartre ' s  
exa�plea, t h e  question ' I s  Pierre tn the c a f  e?'  leaves open the 
poastbtlity that the at\8ver v i l l  be 'No, Pierre i s  not tn the 
cafe . '  My raising the question creates the expectation that I 
vtll aee Pierre, but 1t may not be fulfilled. Vhen i t  i s  not 
5
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f u lfilled, according to Sartre, 1 experience nothingness: 
I have an appoint.en� with Pierre at four o ' clock. 
I arrive a� the c a f e  a quarter of an hour l a t e .  
Pierre ts always punctual. W i l l  he have wai::.ed 
for me ?  
Having raised the q ue s t i o n ,  I expect a reply. In looking for 
Pierre, Sartre goes on, I reduce the cafe to a background 
against which Pierre vtll stand out if he ta there. When 1 
see that he i s  not there (when there t .a  a negative reply to my 
q ue s t i o n ) :  
His abs·enoe fixes the cafe in it.a evanes cence; the 
cafe r ·ema i  ns ground ; • [The figure of Pierre 
raises i t se l f ]  as nothingness on the ground of the 
nihilation of the c a f  e. (W)ha� is offered to intui­
t ion is a flickering of nothin�nea s . 8  
I t  is not Wellington's 
experience, although 
whatever object ts the 




Napoleon's abaence that I 
absent; it is the absence of 
the expectation created by 
Now, suppose the question I raise is about ayaelf, rather 
than about other things or other people. Suppose ! ask, 1 1J h a :  
s}�uld t do�' O r ,  suppose 1 a m  engaged in aome activity and 
ask: 'Should 1 go on doing what I ' m  doing ? '  or 'What a� I going 
to do nex t ? '  tty raisin.R the question introduces the expecta­
t ion of a reply. What do I expect to find Con the analogy with 
expecting to find Pierre in the cafe) that will provide my 
question with an answer? I expect to find SOftle determinants in 
my present self or in my present s i t uation that will govern, 
cause or in some vay y i e l d  my future behavior. When I look for 
such determinants, howeve r ,  j u s t  aa when I looked for Pierre in 
the caf e, they are � there i n  my experience. I experience 
their absence. As long aa I re11LS1ned absorbed in activity and 
did not pause to reflect on what to do next, as long as I did 
not raise q ue s t ions about myself, I was not aware of my free­
d om .  But tn raising the q ue s t ion, I set myself off fr°"' my 
paat--frOlll what I have done or have be n doing--by expecting to 
find tn it something that (in my experience at least) it does 
not contain: a aufficient condi tion for my future behavior. 1 
set myself o f f  from my future because I do not know what l will 
do. l expect to f 1nd something there in my future as my nex� 
a c t ,  but my expectation is not f u l f i l l e d .  l can't predict my 
future behavior because, at least with respect to my conscious­
ness, I do not experience ita determina n t s .  Psychological de­
terminism, Sartre claims, is not given in intuition. I t  exists 
tn the form of a hypotheais to explain the f acta. It must be 
accepted on faith aince it ts not experienced on introspection. 
To understand this point 1D0re fully, ve must notice an 
important distinction: the distinction between those things a 
person � and those things that happen !,2 him. Tvo distinct 
6
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_,des of awarenes s .  fear and anguish. reflect the contrast 
between vhat happen& to us and vhat ve do; and they can be 
d i f ferentiated in part by their objects: 
First ve au5t acknowled'e that Kierkegaard 
i a  right; anguish ia dist inguished from fear in 
that fear ia fear of beings in the world vhereas 
angui.sh ia anguish before myself. 9 
Fear ia not the r as u l t  o f  reflection but arises out of unre­
flective awareness of objects in the vorld. They are seen to 
be dangerous, harmful, potentially destructive. The raising of 
questioDS about what I am goin1 to do to meet the danger 
introduces an�uish: 
The artilleTy preparation which precedes the attack 
can provoke fear in the soldier vho undergoes the 
ba.bard1-!nt, but anguish is born in him when he tries 
to foresee the coduct with vhich he v i l l  face the 
bombardment , when he asks himself if he is going t o  
b e  able t o  ·hold up. •'tlr 
Bere. although Sartre does not discuss ambivalence, ve can see 
hov a reflection on •what I am goin� to do" 1can bring me face 
to face with cont radictory iapulses in the s e l f .  1 vant t o  do 
&<>tee thing courageous--f ace the dan�er--� I want to f l e e .  The 
tvo cancel each other. I experience nothingness, that is, 1 am 
radically free. 
Anguish arises out of a paradoxical feature of human 
existence, one that is a corollary of the fact that as ques­
tion-asking beings human beings expe rience nothingness: 
Nothingness haa slipped into the heart of this 
relation (between my future being and my present 
bein• l ·  1 am not the self which 1 v i l l  be .  • • • I 
a• not that self because what I am is not the founda­
tion of what 1 w il l  be • • • •  Yet as I am already 
what 1 w i l l  be (othet"Wise 1 would not be inter­
e s t ed  in any one being more than another) 1 am the 
self which 1 w i l l  be ,  i n  the mode of not being 
f t . H 
Sartre appears to reject the law of contradiction in its 
interpretation as a metaphysical princi p l e .  "1 aa the self 
which 1 w i l l  be. in the 110de of not being i t . "  And the con­
tradiction provides the philo•ophical underpinnings for an 
understandin1 of the e�perience of anguish. 
It ia in hia diacuaaion of the ways we escape from anguish 
t�t � find Sartre rejectin� the lav of contradiction aa a lav 
of �hought . How is i t ,  he asks, that the feeling of anguish ia 
so rare given that human beinga are "quest ion-asking animals · ?  
One answer i s  that 110 s t  11e n  are · a n  o f  action· -too absorbed in 
7
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action to reflect, to q�ation. to feel anguish. To reflect, 
8 8  no.toevak y ' a  Underground Man re•iDda u s ,  ia to .. ke oneself 
a�ceptible to the disease of hyperconaci ouaneaa--a disease 
fr09 which .. _n of action .. do not au ff er: 
I avear to you, gentle9en. that to be hypercon.cioua 
ia a dia,eue, a real pos i tive disease. Ordinary 
h�n comcioueneas wovld be too •uch for -n 'a 
everyday need s ,  • i t  vould have been qui;e 
enoogh, for ta. tanoe, to have the conaciou•neas by 
vhich a l l  so-called straightforward persons and � n  
of action l i ve . 1 2  
S i n oe ,  howeve r ,  w are •question-asking aql•la• w are bovnd 
at ao� point to aak ourselves 'Vhat .. I going to do next ! '  
aod the chum of freedom vill yavn- a t  oor feet. Thia, I vant 
to arg.ae, ia especially true if our .:>tivea are ambivalent. 
Once the reflective .ove baa been .. de, is there any way to 
avoid the anguish that is the e�perience of f reedoa? The 
amver, for Sartre. is that ve can and do av,oid anguish by 
engaging in self-deception or ·bad faith• (aauvaise f o i ) .  
Ve have already seen hov conscious beings e�per 1ence 
negation through the raisin� of questions. In arldition, 
Sartre's exa•ination of consciousness results in the descrip­
tion of consciousness itself as a nothingness: 
Conaciouaneaa i s  consciousness of aooething. Thia 
-
.eans that transcendence is the cons titutive struc-
ture of consciousness; that is that cons ciousness 
emerges supported by a being vhich is not i t a e l f . 13 
Mirrors are a favorite symbolical repres entation of conscious­
ness for Sa rt re. A mirror 1a empty until a being other than it 
ia reflected i n  i t .  
More significantly. perhaps, and more closely related to 
the development of the relationship between consciousness and 
ambivalenoe is the vay that an experience of nothingness may 
arise through the ·canoeling out• of ambivalent motives. As 
contradictoty premises in logic ·imply everything , ·  I have sug­
gested that genuine ambivalence creates an eaptinesa in the 
self that may require so.ething comparable to self-creation !!. 
nihilo. Some of Sartr e ' s  .oat convincing e�a•ples can be seen 
as examples in vhich the person in anguish is vacillating be­
tween inccape tible poaaibli tiea. The capacity for ambivalence 
muat be one of the defining characteristics of conscious exis­
tence. Things , strictly apes king . could not be ambivalent. 
They are what they are and do what they d o .  Thus ve see another 
reason vtty in its attempt to ne�a te 1ta Olln noithtngneee con­
aciouaneaa attt!1Dpta to apprehend itself from without as an 
O t he r  or as a thit�. 30 
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To apprehend one'a aelf in thia ..,n01er, howeve r ,,  ia to 
e�age in self deceptio�. Thua ;he .etaphysical eacape from 
nothi�gneaa is an eacape into a paradoxical psychologicel 
a c a t e .  The p l a u s i blity. v 1 z .  the non-con�rad1ctory pos s i b i l ­
i ; y .  o f  ordinary cases of decept ion depends on a duality 
between the deceiver aod the deceived. Self-deception, i f  this 
duali ty ia collapaed. appears to be 1spoaa i b l e .  
Deception usually occura w�en, a s  Sartre obeervee, there 
are at leae� two persons: a deceiver and a victi�. Thie 
d ua l i t y  be tween the deceiver and the deceived is caa1mn to a l l  
caaea of deception except thoae of aelf-deception. And it is 
thia duality vhich aeems t o  make deception 2£•&ible . Suppose, 
for exa•ple, I t e l l  you that the train leaves at 1 1 :30 {hoping, 
pei�aps, you ' l l  •ias it and be forced to stay an extra day) 
when I be l i eve that it leavea at 1 1 :00. If I succeed i n  
deceiving you, one o f  the iQgredienta i n  the situation res­
ponsible for •Y aucceea i• that my belief ia hidden from you. 
Pre.u•bly, 1 k.nov what I knov, but unless you can read f11'J 
•ind, you do not have acceea to ., k.owled�e except as I report 
it to you. If you had an independent source of information. 
e . g  • •  in this example a train ached u l e ,  it would be exceedingly 
difficult for me to accaapliah the deception. Suppose. how­
ever, I am at a talc.en i n  •Y information. The train really does 
leave at 1 1 : 30. In general tel"9e, l be l i eve E. to be true. 
assert not-I?_ with the intention of deceivin� you, get you to 
believe not-I?_, and not-I?_ ia true . I t  is not clear that I have 
really deceived you a l t hc>ugh I inteoded t o .  Success in getting 
you to believe aomethiQg that is not the case t s  required for 
deception. and i t  i s  clear in hie examination of deception that 
Sartre has this strong .odel of deception in mind: 
The eaaence of the lie implies in fact that the l i a r  
actually is i n  complete poaaeasion o f  the truth which 
he ta hiding. A man does not l i e  about what he 1 &  
ignorant o f ;  h e  does not l i e  when h e  spreads an error 
of which he himself ia the dupe; he does not lie when 
he ia •iatak.e n . 1 5  
Deception, then. however epistemologically complex, i s  not 
paradoxical. It depends on •Y being able to hide what 1 
believe from you, to give you a f a l a e  report: 
Thus there ia no dtf f iculty in holding that the l i a r  
must make the project of t h e  l i e  i n  entire clarity 
and that he muat poaeeas a cOllplete coeprehension of 
the lie and of the truth vhich he ts altering. I t  1& 
auff icient that an overall opacity hide hia inten­
t i ons from the other; it ts sufficient that the other 
can take the lie for truth. By the l i e  consciouenees 
e f f irma that it exists by nature ea hidden from the 
Other; it utilizes for i t a  own profit the ontological 
d ua l i tl of myaelf and myself in the eyes of the 
othe r .  6 
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illbat ia the motive for self-deception? I want to argue that 
tt� strongest motive is the experience of ambivalence accom­
panied by the necessity for action. � ambi•alent self wants 
and does not want to do �· Sa.@thing euat be done. therefore 
i t  ia necessaty to believe that doing � ia what the self vants; 
i . e .  for action, • lie to 
-oneself ia necessary. 
Since the plausibility, vi z .  the non-contradictory pos­
sibility, of ordinaty cases of deception depends on a duality 
between the deceiver and the deceived, how ia self-deception 
possible? Freud. according to Sartre, ..msuccesefully a t t empt• 
to retain the duality between the deceiver and the deceived in 
ca•e• of self-deception by split ting the s e l f .  As we •-" 
earlier. when the tension between oppos ites bee�• too intense 
to tolerate rationally, split ting or •twinning • ia often the 
·solution·. The price. however. for this resolution of con­
tradiction ia freq\�ntly the generation of a nev s e t  of para­
do•s . 
On Sartre's account of Freud, which haa been euch disputed, 
the ego is deceived by the id in a aanner analogous to the way 
one person deceives another. And i t  ia interesting to note 
that i n  arguing aiainat Freud, Sartre uses contradiction in • 
traditional way. He argues that certain contradictory assump­
tions would have to 1be aade about the relations between id and 
ego if the Fruedian account were to be uphe l d .  Thie emerges tn 
his discussion of t h e  phenoeenon of re:siatance where some part 
of the self aeees both to know and not to know that the analyst 
1s ·�etti?lg close to the truth . ·  When Freud introduces the 
censor to resolve such problems , he must according to Sartre 
see the censor, mediating between the ego and the i d ,  as in bad 
faith. With the introduction of a ·self-deceived censo r , ·  
howeve r ,  the duality be tween the deceiver and the deceived has 
collapsed. Freud has not really shown ua how self-deception ia 
possible. The anal()5ly with deceiving others vill not work . 17 
H°", then, is self-deception possible according to Sartre. 
lt i a  possible only because human beings are capable of en­
gaging in the ·art of forming contradictory conce p t s . ·  Sartre 
preserves unity by seeing those who are 1self-deceived as 
exemplifications of the violation of the law o.f contradiction 
as a psychological lav. 
\lhat unity do we find in these various aspects of bad 
faith? It is a certain art of forming contradictory 
concepts which unite in themselves both an idea and 
the negation of that tdea. 1 8 
\lhy ta i t  necessary f o r  ua to be able to · f o rm  contractory 
concepts• to be in bed faith? To identify ourselves as con­
scious beings with something fixed, to conceive our existence 
•• like that of a thing requires contradictory concepts since, 
according to Sartre, ·consciousness ta a being the nature of 
which is to be conscious of the nothingness of ita bein�.· 
There ia a n  analogy here with �ierkegaard'a exploration of 
10
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f eith in God. For Abrehe•, aa Kierkegaard describes him. to 
have f etth. be -.aat be able to entertain. if not stricly 
epe�iog contradictory concepta, highly inc09petible ones . Re 
•uat believe that God vill keep his pramtse end give him 
deacaodante through Isaac at the aa.e time that he f u l l y 
i'ntends to secrif tce Isaac in accordance v1th God's comaand . 19 
Whtle other philoaophara intrigued by the phena.enon of 
eelf-deceptton have tried t o  rid 1f of it• paradoxical e t r ,  
Sartre sppears t o  accept i t •  contradictory qualities . F o r  ht�, 
t he n ,  to aoderatand this central aspect of our existence we 
•u•� deny that the law of contredit 1on holds .. a la� of 
thought. 
rtaally. to deaertbe human e•istence ve must use a contra­
diction. -We have to deal with huaan reality as a being vhtch 
ie what it le not end which i s  not what i t  i a . ·  
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The S�n Self: 
Ambivalent or Paradoxical? 
George J .  Srack 
Although I em in eubetanttal agree.ent vtth .any of the 
q,�stto08 that are raised tn Judith Tor11ey'a interpretation of 
a central feature of S a rtre's conception of the aelf, there are 
a nuaber of potnte ehe .akea vtth which l vould have to dta­
agree. In general, the charact erizat ion of the self tn Sartre 's 
t'bought aa ·contradictory• ia alao disputable even though i t  
•uet � aaid, tn a l l  f airneee, that Sartre himself aoeettmes 
auggeata auch a notion. 
It te ironic, tn a vay, that Freud ' s  conception of the 
aplittt,_ of the aelf ta described •• a for• of paychologtcal 
Hanicheantam. Por, tf anyone haa Manichean tendencies of 
thought, it te Sartre. But hie tendency to think in te"6 of 
radical dualities te prtiurtly found in hie di stinction bet·veen 
repulsive '"be1nge-in-the•selvea'" (or vhat others call Mtertal 
beings or thtnga ) a nd  the traoaceDdent purity of the -for 
itself- or consctoueneaa .  Relying basically on Sartre'• 
reference to the role of contradictory concepts in bad f atth, 
Ke. Totwey aaeu�e t hat thta 111eana that the s e l f  deecrtbed by 
Sartre is ·contradictory· and relates this assumption to the 
psychological conception of ••bi valence. It te precisely this 
concatenation of ideas that ia queattonable. 
A9'bivalence , as l understand i t ,  ie a psychological atate 
tn vhtch an individual experiences uncertainty because he or 
a.he ie unable to .ake a choice or because he or ehe hae a 
eimultaneoua desire or proclivity to say o r  do oppoei;e thing s .  
Thie general definition o f  ambivalence hae a .ore apectftc 
application to psychoanalytic thought :  it ta the coexistence of 
positive and negative feeltnga tOt1arda the aa.e person, object, 
or action. In te?Wi of either a general or apec·iftc notion of 
a•btvalence, it ta difficult to eee why it ahould be construed 
a e  analogous to logical contradiction. A love-hate relatton­
ahtp certainly h.. contradictory teoaiooa and conf ltcttng 
desires or a t titudes that are dtequtettng; but neither are 
contradictotY in a strictly logical e e ne e .  Raving positive and 
negative feelings tovarde someone or aomethtng ta an under­
atandable psychological atate, and it does not violate the lav 
of contradiction. It ta for this reason that I believe that 
•uch of vhat ta aatd about Sartre'• oatenatble notion of an 
ambivalent aelf ta questionable. 
The ambivalent self that Tormey deacribea aa a kind of 
living logical contradiction, one that ta deter•:ined to act by 
nothing, aee.s to be J110re her creation than Sartre ' • •  And the 
auggeatton that Sartre holds that the aalf ta radically free 
14
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because i t  18 'a•bivaler.t ' i s ,  at leas t ,  •1slead1ng. For 
Sartre, the self that hss �en (one ' s  pas � )  is not free; 1 t i s  
a •tacticity·. The s e l f  that e�i•t• for others i s  ar. objecti­
f i e d  s e l f ,  a being for others that is petrified not only by 
•the look, • but by evaluation and judg�nt as we l l .  In ter•s of 
the invardneas of comciouaness, the ' s e l f '  is dyna•i. c ,  in 
proce s s ,  ·surging· (in Sartre ' s  metapt�rical laoguage) towards 
vhat it is not y e t ,  but .. y becot1e. We are free, for Sa�tre, 
for the ai•ply s t a t ed ,  but met aphysically coeplex, reason that, 
as comciousnees, ve are not beings in the vorld: ve are an 
dDdeter•ined no-thing. We are radically free because, in 
Sartre ' a  viev, our preaent con11cioueness is not deter•ined by 
anything, not even our ovn past. S o ,  if •Y interpretation of 
Sartre i• viable, the point of the ••bivalence of the self is 
irrelevant to hie defence of freedo•. letveen our past aeries 
of choices, decisions , aod actions eod a present choice, there 
ia vhat Sartre ca l l s  a caesura, a break, a pause or, in CllOre 
dra.atic lan�uage, "nothingn es s · .  Civen h i s  rather daring 
theory of the 'structure' of conaciousn e a e ,  Sartre haa the 
basic ingredient for hi• defence of rad i c a l  freedo�. A•bi­
valence aey i•pede or inhibit choice and action, but once an 
act ta undertaken ( i n  Sartre'a account of the ma t t e r ) ,  then ve 
are aubject to the universal causal nexua of phyaical eventa. 
What I have elaevhere called the idea of abstract freedo� 
rooted in the ontological structure of conaciousne•• is central 
to Sartre'a concepton of the origin of freedo•• Even the moat 
••bivalent of persons cannot � concretely in an '••bivalent' 
vay. And an action, despite the Marxian belief in ontological 
'contradiction• ' i n  nature or society, cannot be literally 
comtrued aa contradictory. 
In regard to the issue of deception of others, I agree 
wholeheartedly vith what Judith To�y ha• said on the 1D8tter. 
the deceiver of others •use, obviously, know what he i s  not 
telling others . The corporation executive who tell• a group of 
workers that if they increase productivity, then they will 
probably forest a l l  future staff reductions is deceiving them if 
he knova that there will be inevitable reduction• in the work­
force with or without increased production. The cunning 
deceiver, of course, uaually only i•pliea or augg�•t• something 
which he knova will not take place. Deception � lying; but i t  
i a  alao ao•etimea •isleading others, offering veiled proeiaes, 
.. ntpulating t� feeling• of others, and •uch .aore. 
Self-deception, aa Tonney correctly shows, i• eomevhat more 
complicated. \lhile it does aee� t o  entail a kind of duality, 
it is not necessarily a duality in t h e  s e l f .  It is one and the 
aame per11on who tries to diaguiae or hide hie or her true 
aotivea, be l i e f  a, or feeling• froa hi .. e l f  or herself. Freud 
i s  quite cOBpetitive with Sartre on chi• score. Eapecially i n  
h i s  analy•i• of the •defence mechania .. • that people co11.110nly 
uae, he 1 •  insightful. ln rationali&ation, for exaaple, we 
present for public comu•ption an acceptable reason for our 
behavior which diaguiaea a rationale that 11ay not be too 
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f lattertng. A pe rs o n  makes a generous contribution t o  a 
popular charity out of pure generosi:y (he says to others and 
to hmiel f ) ,  b u t ,  tn his subjective consciousne s s ,  he knows that 
he made the cont ribution purely for self-interested reasons ( t o  
d i s play public service for some anticipated gain, t o  obtain a 
substantial reduction of taxes, e t c . ) .  Of cours e ,  since these 
mo t ives for behaving tn a certain way aeY not be acceptable to 
the !'!!.�� or self-tcnage of such a person, he endeavors to 
obscure them f roe his own view by •pushing the� into the 
uncon&ctous .t nd . ·  Less esoterically put, one could say that 
the self-deceiver engages tn ·select ive forge t t ing . ..  The 
subjective transforeatton of a motive or rationale aa y ,  as 
Freud a f f i rms and Sartre denies, involve something very much 
like ·unconscious .. patterns of thinking. Certainly, as Tormey 
points out, t h i s  process would probably be more coepltcated in 
cases of genuine ambivalence. But, again, 1 see no reason to 
assume a ' s p l i t '  or dtvtston tn the self to account for t h i s .  
Uhen we act out o f  a s t a t e  o f  ambivalence, we ma y  honestly say 
that ve do n o t  actually know why w e  performed a certain act . 
That t s ,  tn the case men� tned above, t f  a person desi res to be 
generous � to seek personal gain through generos i t y ,  the 
action may , i nd e e d ,  proceed out of confltcttng moLtves. This 
t est i f i e s  to the coeplextty of s e l f ,  but not to its logomo rphtc 
' s tructure ' .  
I t.  t s  not, as t s  s a i d, the condt tton of ambivalence that 
creates an .. e•pttness- tn the s e l f ,  for Sartre. In a s t r ic t  
s e ns e ,  consciousness t s  not the " s e l f .  tn Sartre 's view. 
Consciousness ts the prt1110rdtal ort�tn of freedom, posstbltcy, 
and hence, choice, decision, and a c t i o n. The s e l f  ts what we 
become through a c t i o n .  As Sartre says in his popular essay, 
•Existentialism as Hucnantsm,· a "man t s  the suUI of his ac­
t i o ns . ·  T h e  real i z a t i o n  of one projecc entails the ne�a�ton of 
c ,om pe t tng projects. Anbtvalence tn regard t.o compe ting choices 
ts only resolved through decisive choice and subsequent action. 
Uhtle deliberation ts an a c t  of consciousness, it does not 
entail concrete action. If we were able co remain in a state 
of ambivalent 1m1110bt l t t y  or indecisivenes s ,  then we could not 
strive to realize a ·project• a n d ,  hence, i n  Sartre ' s  view, we 
would neither act nor exist tn the strong sense of that word . 
The teneton tn human existence that Sartre refers to tn regard 
to •bad f a i t h •  has to do primarily with a tendency to deny our 
freedom by trying to become an object, a ·being tn itse l f . ·  
The watter, t n  Sartre's exa1'.ple t n  Being and Nolhin!!!ess , who 
thinks of htaself wholly and entirely as a ·wa i t e r , ·  as a kind 
of ·watter--tn-ttsel f,  • ts not anbtvalent towards his behavior 
and he ts not tn a s t a t e  of ambivalence. He ts cons c i o u s l y  
w ill ing to present himself a s ,  and think of h i ms e l f  a s ,  a 
waiter by denying h i s  • transcendence , ·  his freedom. Self­
deceptton ts taraanent tn such a s i t uation because this project 
cannot be completed • • •  because the person (or consciousnes s )  
who endeavors t o  be a watter only t s  aware t h a t ,  as a free 
conactousnes s ,  he ts above or outside what. he t s  trying t o  be .  
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Tor.ey ie ri�h� �her. she eaye tha� s e l f -decep� ion requires what 
Sartre calls the ·art of for•ing con�radictory conce p � s . ·  The 
pel"aoo playing t �  social role of · v a 1 t e r · 1 n ·bad fai�h"" knows 
that be 11 tryt � c.o exhaue� h 1 1  entire be1ng tn the role of 
·wa1-.er· and he ta q1.d:.e evare that he ta no�, in a strict 
aeme, eole-1 y a "aiter. By trying to become the •f acticity• of 
being a wat�er. the person thinks, "" l  am a w a t t e r . ·  However, 
aa I unde ratand S a r t re' a poaitton here, the same �non also 
knove, aa a free con&ciouaneaa, that ·r am not a waite r . ·  This 
ta the paradox of ·bad faith•: aa long aa man haa the nature of 
both a bound f actictty and a totally free coll8c1oueneae, he 
cannot achieve authentic self-deception tn.sof ar .. he ta 
conactoualy aware of acctng in ·bad f a i t h . -
The analysts o f  be d  f a t t h  in Being and Nothingness and the 
coeval analyete of &elf-deception ta one of the llO S �  su btle 
arguments in a work replete vi�h eoph1st1ca ted philoaophtcal 
arguments. Briefly stated, Sartre argues that no one can claim 
to be ,  vbolly and entirely, what he ta and no one can claim to 
be entirely vhat he ia not. I cannot , to ta�e Sartre ' s  ex­
ample, think of myself ae a total coward, as an absolute 
coward, because I cannot determine myself aa a finished, 
complete entity, aa a being in i t s e l f .  For, fll'f consctouenea1 
of intentionally determining f!lY&elf ae a "'coward· is a free act 
of a free conscioueneee that eludes my cognitive determination 
of myself aa a ·coward.· No one can be a total coward any ri.ore 
than anyone can be an ·honest person.· Vith sufficient know­
ledge of someone afi'e r hie or her death we 11ay say, •tte was a 
coward . ·  Thie ie poaatble because the person referred to 1e now 
a co.plete facticity. In the hell in which three characters 
live in No E x i t ,  the characters suffer from the full il lumina­
tion, without excuse, of their being, their f acticity shaped 
through their actions in life. For one who has lived in •bad 
faith• or who has trfed to do ao, thia t a ,  indeed, h e l l .  Ae 
long ae ti(e are actively involved in the proceee of l i f e ,  
however ,  we a r e  paradoxical beioga compriaed, eaaentially, of 
trall8cendence (freedom) and f acticity (determination).  It ie 
t h i s  dual i t y ,  and not etatee of ambivalence, that make the 
project of bed faith poa eible, but unattainable. 
If it were genuinely poaaible, which it ie not, literally 
to be ( l e t  ue say) courageoue, then the project& of bed faith 
and self-deception could be carried out. If one were com­
pletely courageous, then one would have become a complete 
being, a finished human product, an object like others. Living 
in bad f a i t h ,  as Sartre describes 1 t ,  positively requires that 
my project to be courageous be impossible. A non-conecioua 
object cannot be i n  •bad faith• because it ta what i t  t a .  I t  
h .. no alterity i n  i t se l f ;  i t  cannot be what i t  t e  n o t .  The 
purity and perfection of works of art,  eepec .ially eci.tlpturee, 
ie espoused by Sartre precisely because of hie consistent 
ontology. A fine piece of sculpture ie complete in i t s e l f ,  
perfect of i t e  t i nd ,  a pleasing, beautiful , aesthetically 
perceived facticity. If ve ask why Sartre· 11a1ntains that no 
one can be totally atncere o r  completely immersed in bad faith, 
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we �usl turn, ae ToI'llley almost does, t o  his ontology of hun111n 
being. A t  this point, o f  course, temporary states of ambiva­
lence, as w e l l  as the ·ambivalent s e l f , - are l e f t  behind. 
In concluding portions of the paper under consideration, 
it ie said thal human existence must � described in tel"1U of 
contrad i c t i o n  presumably because t he  s e l f  hae a contradictory 
nature. Ad�i t t e d l y ,  thie is an interpretation that Sartre him­
s e l f  somet.imes seeas to i n v i t e .  Howeve r ,  it i e  misleading. 
\lithout getting into the int.ricacies of Sartr e ' s  unusual onto­
logy and sotne of i t s  i n ternal conceptual d i f f i c u l t i e s ,  we can 
safely say that S a r t r e ' s  phenomenology moves from a description 
of conscious nes s ,  i t e  being and its a c L e ,  to a description of 
being-for-others and f i n a l ly to concrete action in a world com­
prised of ·instrumental c<llllplexes , �  cultural o b j e c t s ,  and the 
ever-presen t ,  elight. ly menacing. "others . ·  In a eense , we hAve 
to read Being and Nothingness f orwarde,  but understand it back­
�ards. For, what Sartre presents s e r i atim, out of phenomenolo­
gical neces s i t y ,  is r e a l l y  exp�rienced a l l  a t  once in t h e  dy­
namics of a c t u a l t i t y .  The concrete freedom and concrete action 
mentioned a t  the conclusion of his work entails an interaction 
of consciousneee and f a ct i c i t y ,  an interaction that. is explored 
in C r i t ique de !.!.. raison d i a l e c L ique .  Aside from the a r t i f i ­
c i a l  descriptions o f  a phenomenology o f  human r e a l i t y ,  exis­
tence takes place i n  a causal network comprising -the world­
and, in that world, consciouenees is iromanent in ma n t a  f a c t i ­
c i t  y .  The l i v i ng s e l f  is neither coneciouenees nor f a c t i c i ,t y :  
i l  i s  created, for be t t e r  o r  worse, through the action of what 
may be c a l l e d  a ·consci ousness-body . - As ironical as i t  
sounds, given S a r t r e ' s  preoccupation w i t h  the internal pro­
ceeees of consciousn e s s ,  the e e l f  i s  a public e n t i t y ,  something 
that exists for others. It is for this reason that he says that 
Marcel Proust i s  the author o f  Remembrance of TI\ings Paet and 
other works, the person known by others who lived h i s  life in a 
certain way. Proust is not what, in imagination, he may have 
thought he was;  his dreams, h i s  fantasies , hie unfulfilled 
p l a ns, hie hope s ,  all of these are evanescent a n d  irrelevant to 
what, f i n a l l y ,  he was. This view o f  the self i s  what accounts 
for S a r t r e ' s  tendency to present individuals in what seems to 
be a hareh, uneecapable, total i l lumina t i o n .  P u t  simply, ve are 
what we become in our l i f e t i me  through the reali�ation of our 
proj e c t s ,  no matter how humble or grandiose they IDSY b e .  
The incomplete s e l f ,  the e e l f  i n  process o f  fonnation, the 
s e l f  we are ineluctably becoming through our proj e c t s ,  our 
choices, and our actions , t h i s  s e l f  is paradox i c a l ,  but not 
ambivale n t .  The fonnula cited a t  the end o f  "The Ambivalent 
S e l f� should have been c i t e d  at i t s  beginning. For, i t  is the 
key to S a r t r e ' s  understanding of the becoming of the s e l f .  
A l t  hough some philoaphers i n  the Anglo-American, lingu i s t i c  
analysis camp have found t h i e  conception of human reality 
�untidy , - Sartre knows exactly what he is saying. Prom 
Kie rkegaard, in the f i r s t  i ns t ance , and from Heidegger, Sartre 
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has adop�ed the f ur.daaien�al on�ology of aan that conceives of 
h i m  as a dyr.a�ic s y n � h e s i s  of �hat Kierkegaard called -neces­
a t t y - and ·pos s i b i l i t y - end Heidegger celled Faktizitat and 
Hogl i chke i t .  l n  t e nias  o f  what an individual h as  done up t o  the 
preaenc and in tenis of vhac. he or ahe has endured up to the 
·present , the individlual 's being 18 characterh.ed by f a c t ic: i t y .  
Only vhac hae already occurred i s  'neceaaar)'·' o r  ltae � e n  
e 111pirtcally de t e na1ned. 1f un were o n l y  ¥hat h e  has been or 
ia now, he vould be aaal ogous to a mere beiog (Seie�) or an 
e t re-en-•oi. However, ae �ierkegaard f.t rs t  aaid and later 
William James asserted in the name of a •naniah thinker , ·  .. n 
· u vea forward . "  What a person hae done or haa Wldergone 
,cannot be effaced or negated. But a peraon'a potentiali tiea or 
existential poaaibilit iea have -not yet" been realized. I f  
they • Y  or u y  not be realized i n  futuro, then they are 
contingent po•aibi l i t i e s .  Si nce thinkers aa diverae as 
Aristotle and Hampahire have tneiated that aan has unique 
·potent t a l i t i ee ,  then, in thia aenee, potentiality ta pert of 
the bei n,r of u n .  
traoelatiog the above into Sartre'a paradoxical i d i om ,  ve 
aee that he holda that un ta not vhat he ia ( i . e . ,  ta not his 
neceaatty o r  hie already detetwined empirical actuality) and 
i a ,  in a a e ne e ,  what he ta not ( i . e . ,  ta hie potentialitiea or 
'hia poasibi l i t i es ) .  An individual ts construed as living 
t°"ards future, as yet unrealized, poasibi l i t i �  (or projects) 
.and being 110ti vated in hie behavior by vhat Kterke�aard ac­
curately described as a "subjective teleology . ·  The person 
e x t s t a ,  in a aense, at the ontoloaical intersection of factt­
city and possibility and ts not truly either, but a paradoxical 
ayntheaie of both. This, 1 believe, is what Sartre mean& in 
hia often cited for•ula for the nature of human reality. In 
this aenee, the aelf that ta in proceaa of becami� cannot be 
entirely determined because it ta vola t i l e ,  dyn88 1 c ,  or under­
going change . The eelf ta in the proceaa of creation, for 
better or worae, throu�hout a per1on•a Uf e t i tE .  It ta not 
analogous to a logically self-identical concept and i t  ta not a 
livtag "contrad i c t i o n . �  Ambivalent aomet imea, but eaaentially 
paradoxic a l .  In fact, aa Kierkegaard once aaid, if .. n were 
not p•rado�ical in hia being, then he could not change , could 
not atrive to realize poaaibili t i e a ,  could not, in a atrict 
aen.e, exist. Sartre •aya that i t  ta through aan that 
•nothingne a a ·  (•conaciouaneaa) enters the world; h e  •tght j u s t  
a a  we l l  have aatd that i n  human exiatence poaaibi lity enters 
the world. Kierkegaard , Heidegger, and Sartre a l l  acknowledge 
"objective poaaibil i t i e a "  i n  the world aa much aa the dedicated 
ampiriciat doea. However ,  given their philoeophical conce rna, 
they are lm:>re intereated in exaMining subjective possibi l ities. 
Contradiction in thought and being that Tol"fl'ey attributes 
to �artre'a oetensible conception of the "ambivalent aelt• are 
really paradoxical f eaturee of the dynamic nature of the s e l f  
t h a t  Sartre def e od a .  It doea not teke a genius to show ua that 
i nd i viduals are subject to conflicting eotivee, ambivalent 
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feelings,  and conflicting goals. But these subject ive states of 
being are not testimony to the ambivalent nature of the s e l f .  
Even in the mo a t  common choices we make w e  are, a s  Kierkegaard 
insightfully put i t ,  "in-between- possibility (a projected 
possibility of choice and action) and actuality (our empirical 
actuality up to and including the presen t ) .  An &•bivalent self 
such as Tormey depicts would suffer the paralysis and imm>bil­
ity that she aptly descTibes. But this ' s e l f '  is actually only 
a potential s el f ,  a character who is unable to resolve the pro­
blem of opposing possiblities of choice or action, who is inde­
cisive. This i s  virtually a portrait of the character ·A· i n  
Either/Or, a character who i s  compa red to a pawn surrounded on 
a chessboard that is unable -to a.>ve." Such a person is para­
digmatically living an inauthentic .ode of existence. 
Central t o  the existential ' therapy' of Sartre (and his 
predecessors) i s  the a t t empt to encourage them t o  become 
decisive in their lives, to liberate them for genuine choice. 
The appeal to von Wright 's notion that temporal processes are 
both .£.. and -£_ brings us back to an Hegelian conception of 
actuality. And t h i s ,  in turn, brings us back to Aristotle's 
idea that change requires a transition froai a potential state 
to an actual s t a t e .  This, of course, i s  where Kierkegaard, 
Heidegger, and Sartre enter the picture. But they prefer to 
point to the paradoxical tension& o f  human existence rather 
than using the logical model of what seems to be a kind of 
existential contradiction in the s e l f .  To be sure, there are 
opposing tendencies in the s e l f ,  even dialectical oppositions, 
but 1Q8n is not subject to a living, logical 'contradiction. ' 
The simple reason for t h i s ,  especially in Sartre's case, is 
that man is not interpreted i n  accordance with the 110del of 
logic. A person is never logically self-identified and never 
logically self-contrad i c t o i y .  I t  is S a r t r e 'a phenomenological 
ontology of human reality that determinee his rather complex 
analysis of the s e l f ,  self-deception, and ·bad f a i t h . "  Need­
less to say, i t  is decidedly .!!.2� a logo.orphic ontology. If i t  
is sometimes a psycho,logist ontology o f  human e:itistence, this 
is because Sartre believes, with good reason, that the psycho­
logical states o f ,  and psychological experiences o f ,  man are 
relevant to a full understanding of how tAan experiences him­
s e l f ,  others and the w o r l d .  H mf  we can talk about man and his 
experience without impinging on the deep psychological dimen­
sion of human life is d ifficult to understand. Ambivalence i s ,  
indeed , part o f  t h a t  experience; but i t  i s  not t h e  bssis o f  
Sartre's conception o f  the s e l f .  
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